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Abstract
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework
of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions
that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption in-
dividual preferences can be aggregated into a single choice function ex-
pressing a collective preference. In this framework, a two-sided matching
problem may be described as an agreement problem between two parties,
each of which is characterized by a choice function over the set of con-
tracts: the two parties must find a stable agreement, i.e., a set of contracts
from which no party will want to take away any contract and to which the
two parties cannot agree to add any contract. On such stable agreements
a party’s preference relation is a partial order and the two parties have
inverse preferences. An algorithm is presented that generalizes algorithms
previously proposed by Gale-Shapley, Roth, Kelso-Crawford, Alkan-Gale,
Hatfield-Milgrom and Hatfield-Kominers in less general situations. To
any agreement problem, this algorithm provides a stable agreement that
is preferred to all stable agreements by one of the parties and therefore
less preferred than all stable agreements by the other party. In this algo-
rithm the agents’ preferences are expressed only by their choice functions
and therefore no notion of utility is assumed. The number of steps of
the algorithm is linear in the size of the set of contracts, i.e., polynomial
in the size of the problem. The algorithm provides a proof that sta-
ble agreements form a lattice under the two inverse preference relations.
Under additional assumptions on the role of money in preferences, agree-
ment problems can describe general two-sided markets in which goods
are exchanged for money. Stable agreements provide a solution concept,
including prices, that is more general than competitive equilibria. Sta-
ble agreements exist in many situations in which there is no competitive
equilibrium. They satisfy an almost one price law for identical items. The
assignment game can be described in this framework and core elements of
an assignment game are exactly the stable agreements.
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1 Introduction
Matching is a topic of intense research activity and has provided many deep and
beautiful theoretical results, solutions to practical problems of great importance
and original conceptual insights into the description of preferences, equilibrium
theory, social choice theory and the conception of auction mechanisms. It is not
possible to survey here even a small part of this activity. It is only those results
directly related to the present work that will be mentioned below.
Gale and Shapley [11] described one-to-one and a restricted form of one-to-
many matching problems. They showed that the existence of a stable solution
was guaranteed for all possible preferences of the agents. They also showed
that, in the one-to-one situation there is, for each of the two sides, a stable
solution that is optimal for it and that, in the one-to-many situation there is
such a stable solution that is optimal for the side interested in a single agent
(the doctors’ side). In [17] Knuth attributes to J.H. Conway the remark that
the stable solutions to the one-to-many matching problems above form a lattice
under a suitable partial ordering. Kelso and Crawford [16] considered a more
general situation: the job market, matching firms with teams of workers that
receive a salary, whereas a worker can work for only one firm. A discussion of
a possible lattice structure for stable solutions to the Kelso-Crawford problem
can be found in [26, 28]. Blair [7] considered a generalized job market in which
workers can contract with many firms and showed that, even in such a many-to-
many matching situation the stable solutions present a lattice structure. The
study of many-to-many matchings has been actively pursued since, see, for
example, [10].
All the studies mentioned above assume a full description of the preferences
of the agents, by a total ordering on the set of all subsets of alternatives. The
stream of research in economic theory, initiated by Samuelson [30, 31], devel-
oped by [34] and brought to matching theory in [26, 28, 3] proposed to assume
only preferences revealed by the agents’ actions. The agents’ preferences are
represented by choice functions that pick, out of a set of possible choices, the
one preferred.
In their seminal article [15], Hatfield and Milgrom proposed a fundamental
shift of focus. Instead of focusing on the preferences that agents on one side
have for agents on the other side (or for groups of agents on the other side)
they suggested that one should focus on the preferences of the agents on subsets
of a set of contracts, where each contract links two agents on opposite sides.
They achieved two goals: they broke out of the limited framework of the job
market in which only a single salary parameter was considered, and they opened
the way for considering preferences that were not preferences on the agents of
the other side. For them, choice functions that satisfy a substitutes property
describe the preferences of hospitals over sets of doctors, not utility functions.
Many researchers pursued the paths opened by [15] and many of them will be
mentioned below.
2
2 About this paper
2.1 Goals and summary
This paper’s goal is to generalize the one-to-many matching with contracts
situation of [15] to a many-to-many situation and to study the structure of the
stable solutions in such a situation. It can be compared to [10], which does not
consider contracts.
In this paper, preferences of the agents over sets of contracts are specified by
choice functions without any assumption on the structure of the set of contracts.
A set of three conditions on choice functions guarantees
1. that the aggregation of the choice functions of all agents on the same
side satisfies the same conditions and represents the collective preferences
of the side in question, thus reducing the many-to-many situation to a
one-to-one situation,
2. that a natural partial order can be defined on stable solutions,
3. that the set of stable solutions is always a non-empty lattice under this
partial order, and
4. that a simple, elegant algorithm, expressed in terms of two choice func-
tions, that generalizes all previously described matching algorithms, al-
ways finds an extremal stable solution.
General two-sided markets can be described in this framework by postulating
that consumers prefer low prices and producers high prices, and that none of
them cares with whom he or she trades. A Law of two prices is proved: identical
goods are traded at an essentially uniform price. An example of such a market
is the assignment game of [35]. The core elements of the game are exactly the
stable solutions of the market, putting in evidence a proximity between two of
Shapley’s works, [11] and [35] that had been sensed in the latter work but could
not be formalized.
2.2 Plan of this paper
This paper develops a significant mathematical apparatus, but its purpose is
mainly conceptual. Therefore it stresses the change of perspective it proposes
on matching and delays the mathematical results as much as possible. Section 3
discusses the representation of preferences over subsets of a given set. Section 4
defines the set of coherent choice functions that will be used to represent pref-
erences. It explains the three properties appearing in the definition, surveys
the literature and presents examples of coherent choice functions. Section 5,
describes many-to-many matching when the agents’ preferences are specified by
coherent choice functions. It defines the collective preferences of each side and
shows that those are also coherent. Section 6 redefines many-to-many matching
with coherent choice functions as an agreement problem between two parties
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each of them equipped with a coherent choice function. It proposes a solution
concept: stable agreements, that generalizes the stable solutions of the one-to-
many matching problems. Section 7 presents an algorithm, in terms of choice
functions, that finds a stable agreement. It shows that it reduces to the Gale-
Shapley differed acceptance algorithm in the marriage problem and that it is
a polynomial-time algorithm. Section 8 is the technical part of this paper and
is devoted to the proof of the properties of the algorithm defined in Section 7.
It includes a proof of the lattice structure of the set of stable agreements. Sec-
tion 9 generalizes the framework of many-to-many matching with contracts to
economies of producers and consumers in which money is present. It shows that
stable agreements define prices for items. Section 10 considers the assignment
game of [35]: it shows that core elements and stable agreements coincide in
generic situations. Section 11 describes open problems and future work. In
particular it suggests that many-to-many matching may be the right framework
to understand imperfect finite bilateral markets. Section 12 is a conclusion.
3 The representation of preferences
Preferences, or incentives, are at the center of economic theory and a lot of
effort has been devoted to understanding and formalizing them. In situations
where the preferences are on the elements of an unstructured set, preferences
are described in one of two ways:
1. a quantitative description that associates a number, its value or its utility,
to each element, or
2. a qualitative description by a binary relation between elements that de-
scribes which elements are preferred to which.
Any quantitative description induces a natural total and transitive relation, i.e.,
a total pre-order, on the elements. Qualitative descriptions are almost always
taken to be total pre-orders. Any total pre-order can be defined by a utility
function, and therefore one can relatively easily translate from one description
to the other.
The picture is quite different when preferences are on a structured set. In
this work, following Hatfield and Milgrom’s [15], preferences are on the subsets
of a base set, and preferences are assumed to satisfy certain conditions in respect
to the subset structure. In [11] the authors present the agents’ preferences in the
marriage problem as preferences on the items of an unstructured set: boys have
preferences over the set of girls and reciprocally, but this is, in fact, not the most
natural description. To express the fact that a solution is a complete matching,
i.e., that nobody stays unmatched, the authors have to impose this restriction as
a hard constraint: partial matchings will not be considered, whereas, had they
chosen to describe preferences of, say boys, as a preference over sets of girls,
they could have formulated their restriction as a soft constraint by assuming
that boys prefer singletons over all other subsets, and could have shown that
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their solution indeed is a complete matching. As soon as one considers one-
to-many matchings one cannot avoid considering preferences over subsets, e.g.,
firms have preferences over sets of workers.
In this work we shall assume that preferences are over the collection of all
subsets of a set X . The elements x ∈ X will be called contracts. The setX is the
set of all possible contracts. One may describe such preferences in a quantitative
way by a valuation v : 2X →R that associates a real number to any subset of
X . This is, for example, the way Kelso and Crawford proceed in [16]. They
defined a family of such valuations, the gross-substitutes valuations, and proved
their results under the assumption that preferences are gross-substitutes. Since
there is, in their framework, no place for a gross-net distinction, this family
of valuations will be referred to as v-substitutes in this paper. There is a vast
literature on this class of functions and the interested reader will find recent
surveys and references in [22, 21]. A Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed if all
agents in a market have preferences described by v-substitutes valuations.
To describe preferences for matching in a qualitative way, one could look
for a suitable family of binary relations on 2X . But the revealed preferences
method suggests another formalization: describe an agent’s preferences by a
function f : 2X → 2X that associates any subset A of X to the subset of A that
the agent prefers to all subsets of A. In Section 8.1.2 we shall define a transitive
binary relation associated with such a function. Hatfield and Milgrom [15] use
such choice functions satisfying the Substitutes property of Definition 1 below,
but their treatment is not complete as noticed in [5], and they assume additional
structure on the set X . We shall now propose a definition of suitable choice
functions on the set of all subsets of X .
4 Coherent choice functions
Section 4.1 defines and discusses the family of choice functions that will be con-
sidered in the paper: coherent choice functions. Section 4.2 presents examples
of coherent choice functions.
4.1 Definition
A finite setX is given. The members ofX will be called contracts, following [15].
Examples of contracts are: a marriage between a specific boy and a specific girl,
a work contract between a specific firm and a specific worker for a specific
salary and specific work conditions, a sale from a specific producer to a specific
consumer of a specific good at a specific price deliverable in a specific place at
a specific date.
Following the revealed preferences approach of [3], we want to describe
the preferences of an individual over sets of contracts by a choice function
f : 2X → 2X that, for every A ⊆ X , provides the preferred set f(A) of con-
tracts out of all contracts of A. We shall show that, in certain circumstances,
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the collective preferences of a group of individuals can also be defined by such
a choice function.
The following definition encapsulates the properties we want to assume about
the function f . They seem very reasonable if we think in terms of preferences
and a detailed discussion will be provided after Definition 1. It is a claim of this
paper that, in all previously studied matching problems, the preferences of the
players may be described by coherent choice functions.
Definition 1 A choice function f : 2X → 2X is said to be a coherent choice
function iff it satisfies the following three properties, for any A,B ⊆ X:
• (Contraction) f(A) ⊆ A,
• (Irrelevance of rejected contracts - IRC) if x ∈ A ⊆ X and x /∈ f(A),
then, f(A− {x}) ⊆ f(A), and
• (Substitutes) if x ∈ B ⊆ A ⊆ X and x ∈ f(A), then x ∈ f(B).
Note that we allow the set f(A) to be empty, even when A is not. An agent
may prefer no contracts to any other subset of A. A completely different notion
has been called by the same name in [32].
The three properties above have been extensively studied, among others, in
the social choice literature, where the set f(A) is understood as the set of all
the best elements of A, assuming some global order on X . As noticed in [15]
(footnote 4) the intuition is different when one is interested in matching: the
sets of contracts are ordered in some way and f(A) is the best set among all
subsets of A, assuming there is a unique such set. Those three properties are
equivalent to the properties 2.5 – 2.7 of Blair [7]. This set of three properties
has been studied extensively in [20] in the context of nonmonotonic logics. The
present work builds on results obtained there.
Contraction expresses that the best subset of a set A of contracts is a subset
of A. It is so obviously required that most authors do not care to mention it.
Irrelevance of rejected contracts expresses that the absence in the choice set
of a rejected contract cannot cause the acceptance of an additional contract.
If a hospital presented with a set of doctors A that includes doctor d would
reject doctor d, it would not have proposed to additional doctors if the set pre-
sented had been A− {d}. In fact, Lemma 4 will show that the set of contracts
proposed stays unchanged if a rejected contract is omitted: under the assump-
tions we have f(A− {x}) = f(A). This property has been discussed and named
in [5]. Irrelevance of rejected contracts is equivalent to the Local Monotonicity
of [20]. Local Monotonicity is the model counterpart of the logical property
named Cautious Monotonicity introduced in [18] as the proper weakening of
the monotonicity property of classical logics when considering a logic in which
an additional assumption can cause the retraction of a previous conclusion. In
social choice theory, the importance of this property has been put in evidence
by Aizerman and Malishevski [2, 1]. Its importance in matching theory has
not been recognized so far. Its purpose is to guarantee that the choice of the
best subset of a set A (or one of the best subsets of A) is done consistently
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over all subsets of X . Suppose for example that, in a four contracts set, two
subsets {a, b} and {a, b, c} are both best. A choice function must choose one
of them. Suppose we choose f({a, b, c, d}) = {a, b}. Choosing f({a, b, c}) =
{a, b, c} would be inconsistent even though {a, b, c} is best in {a, b, c}. Indeed,
even though f({a, b, c, d}) ⊆ {a, b, c} ⊆ {a, b, c, d}, f({a, b, c}) 6⊆ f({a, b, c, d}),
contradicting IRC.
Our third property is named after [15]. It states that, if a contract x is
accepted when in competition with a set A of contracts, it will be accepted
when in competition with any subset B of A. Under the converse view it
could have been termed Irrelevance of added contracts: the addition to B of
new contracts (in A) cannot make a contract x rejected from B acceptable.
Indeed, it says that no added contract can be complementary to a rejected
contract. It is one of the remarkable intuitions of Hatfield and Milgrom that
this property expresses the fact that contracts are substitutes to one another: if
x ∈ B − f(B) no contract y ∈ A−B can be complementary to x and make us
have x ∈ f(B ∪ {y}). The Substitutes property is equivalent to the properties
(C2) and (C3) of Arrow’s [4] and to property α of Sen’s [33] as will be shown
in Lemma 3. It is a kind of antimonotonicity: if X ⊆ Y , then antimonotonicity
would require: f(Y ) ⊆ f(X), whereas Substitutes only requires that this part
of f(Y ) that is included in X be included in f(X). It expresses the existence of
some kind of coherent test by which the preferred elements of a set are picked up:
the test corresponding to a superset must be at least as demanding as the one of
a subset. The property appears in Chernoff’s [9]. The persistence property of [3]
is very similar. In Section 5, it will be shown that under many circumstances
the preferences of collectives such as hospitals or colleges may also be expressed
by coherent functions.
4.2 Examples
The identity function is a coherent choice function. It describes the preferences
of an agent that is satisfied by what it gets. Note that, if v is any strictly
monotone valuation, the choice function f defined by f(A) is the subset of A
that maximizes v, is the identity.
If the set of contracts X is equipped with some kind of order relation es-
sentially any f that defines f(A) as the best elements of A, in some sense, will
prove to be a coherent choice function. For example, if X is equipped with a
pre-order R, i.e., a reflexive and transitive relation and f(A) is the set of all
elements of A that are maximal in A with respect to R, i.e.,
f(A) = {x ∈ A | ∀y ∈ A, yRx⇒ xRy}
then f is a coherent choice function. The responsive valuations of [27] are also
coherent choice functions.
But, in general, preferences are determined by some kind of ordering on the
subsets of X , not on its elements. In particular, if every subset of X is given
a numerical utility, one may consider the choice function that, given a set A of
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contracts, chooses the subset with the highest utility. Note that, for this to be
possible, there must be a unique subset of highest utility. Appendix A shows
that for every v-substitutes valuation there is a coherent choice functions that
picks out an optimal subset of any set of contracts. There is a submodular
valuation v that defines a choice function that is not coherent. Appendix B
contains a different characterization of coherent choice functions, meaningful
for social choice theory but whose meaning for matching theory is not apparent,
due to Aizerman and Malishevski. It will not be used in this paper.
It is remarkable that the substitutes notion that originates in a utility setting
can be expressed at all, and in an elegant way at that, in a revealed preferences
setting, by properties of choice functions. The twin notion of complements does
not seem to have such an expression.
5 Bilateral many-to-many matching and collec-
tive preferences
5.1 Contracts, individual and collective preferences
In matching theory we are concerned with situations involving two parties of
agents: e.g., men and women, firms and workers, hospitals and doctors, schools
and students, producers and consumers. A contract links two specific individu-
als, one from each party: a man and a woman, a producer and a consumer and
so on. We therefore assume two disjoint finite sets I and J of agents.
Definition 2 For every contract x ∈ X,
• xI denotes the agent i ∈ I mentioned in contract x. For any i ∈ I, Xi
denotes the set of contracts of which i is part, i.e., Xi = {x ∈ X | xI = i}.
• xJ denotes the agent j ∈ J mentioned in contract x. For any j ∈ J , Xj
denotes the set of contracts of which j is part, i.e., Xj = {x ∈ X | xJ = j}.
The preferences of agent a ∈ I ∪ J are represented by a choice function fa
over Xa. The collective preferences of the agents on the same side are repre-
sented by the choice functions fI and fJ on X defined by
fI(A) =
⋃
i∈I
fi(A ∩Xi), fJ(A) =
⋃
j∈J
fj(A ∩Xj). (1)
Intuitively: every agent a ∈ I ∪ J cares only about the contracts of A he or she
is mentioned in: A ∩ Xa and from this set picks his or hers preferred subset
according to his or hers preferences. In other terms fI rejects a contract iff it
is rejected by the agent of I it belongs to, and similarly for J . Equation (1)
expresses a no externalities assumption: agent a is indifferent to the fate of all
contracts that do not concern him or her. Under such an assumption the choice
functions fI and fJ defined in Equation (1) faithfully represents the collective
preferences of the side considered. Even though men are competing among
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themselves for women, one may define a collective preference for the men. But
such a feat cannot be achieved by defining a collective utility for the men since
the collective preferences we want to consider must clearly reflect a very partial
ordering: we do not want the collective to prefer the good of one man over
another, the collective preferences must only reflect what is the joint interest
of all agents on the same side. One of the good news in this paper is that,
in the framework of revealed preferences and coherent choice functions, this is
possible. We shall now show that if each of the choice functions fa is coherent
then the choice functions fI and fJ defined in Equation (1) are coherent.
Theorem 1 If S ∈ {I, J}, and if fi is a coherent choice function for every
i ∈ S, then the choice function fS defined in Equation (1) is also coherent.
Proof: Let f = fS. For Contraction:
⋃
i∈S fi(A ∩Xi) ⊆
⋃
i∈S A ∩Xi = A. For
Irrelevance of rejected contracts: if x ∈ A− f(A), there is a single j ∈ S such
that x ∈ A ∩Xj and
⋃
i∈S
fi(A∩Xi − {j}) =
⋃
i∈S−{j}
fi(A ∩Xi)∪ fj(A∩Xj − {x}) ⊆
⋃
i∈S
fi(A∩Xi)
since fj is coherent. For Substitutes, assume x ∈ B ⊆ A and x ∈ f(A). There is
a single j ∈ S such that x ∈ Xj and therefore x ∈ fj(A ∩Xj). Since fj satisfies
Substitutes, x ∈ fj(B ∩Xj), and therefore x ∈ f(B).
5.2 Preferences in the Gale-Shapley marriage problem
In this paper, in order to explain the algorithm presented in Section 7, we
shall now translate, step by step, the classical marriage problem as presented
in [11] into the framework proposed in this paper. We consider a set I of n
men and a set J of n women. For Gale and Shapley the preferences of man
i are described by a strict total order <i on the set J , and the preferences of
a woman j by a strict total order <j on the set I. Our formalization of the
marriage problem uses a contract set X = I × J that contains all possible pairs
(i, j) where i ∈ I and j ∈ J , and the preferences of each agent i ∈ I are described
by a coherent choice function fi on the set of contracts Xi = {(i, j) | j ∈ J} in
which i participates. We shall now describe the function fi when i ∈ I, i.e.,
i is a man. The description of the choice function of a woman is similar. For
A ⊆ Xi: if A is empty, f(A) is empty and otherwise the set fi(A) is the singleton
{x} where x = (i, w) ∈ A is such that j <i w for any j ∈ J such that (i, j) ∈ A.
This definition expresses that i prefers being married to any woman to staying
single, that he prefers one woman to more than one woman and that among the
available women his preferences are described by <i.
Let us check that such a choice function is coherent. Remember that A ⊆ Xi.
Contraction is obvious. For IRC, if x ∈ A− fi(A) the woman in x is not the
preferred one from A and fi(A− {x}) = fi(A). For Substitutes, suppose A ⊆
B ⊆Mi. If (i, j) ∈ A− fi(A) then there is a (i, w) ∈ A such that w >i j and
the contract (i, j) cannot be the one chosen in fi(B).
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In matching hospitals and interns, couples have to be given special consid-
eration and have been treated by ad hoc modifications: see e.g., [25, 29, 8].
One could wonder whether, in the perspective proposed in this paper, one could
model the preferences of a couple of doctors by a collective choice function. The
answer is that one can but this choice function is not expected to be coher-
ent since the two positions looked for are complementary, not substitutes. A
couple’s choice function does not satisfy the Substitutes property of Definition 1.
In the marriage problem, the collective choice function for men has the
effect of removing from a set A of contracts all contracts (i, j) when there is in
A another contract (i, j′) such that i prefers j′ to j, and similarly for women. If
one considers a typical situation in the matching algorithm of Gale and Shapley
in which men are gathered around women and define the set A of all contracts as
containing exactly those pairs (i, j) such that man i is one of the men gathered
around woman j and if f is the collective choice function for the women’s side,
then f(A) is exactly the set of pairs (i, j) such that i has not been rejected by
j in the curent stage of the algorithm.
6 The agreement problem
6.1 Definition
Section 5 proposed a perspective change: don’t view matching problems as
matching individual hospitals and individual doctors each of which have indi-
vidual preferences but as an agreement problem between two collective prefer-
ences described by two coherent choice functions. Such a perspective subsumes
many-to-many matching and allows to consider rules or constraints, e.g., the
monogamy restriction in the marriage problem, as preferences. In our version
of the marriage problem, polygamous or polyandrous marriages are considered
and it is only the fact that agents prefer a single mate to more than one mate
that ensures a one-to-one pairing. In this framework one may easily introduce
soft rules by translating them into strong preferences.
In this Section we shall define the problem, the agreement problem, that
generalizes the matching problem, define the solution concept for this problem, a
stable agreement and show that this solution concept subsumes stable matchings.
In Section 7 we shall propose an algorithm to solve all agreement problems
and, then, in the remainder of this paper we shall show that the study of this
algorithm enables us to prove that stable agreements exist and present a lattice
structure.
We now assume a finite set X of contracts and two coherent choice func-
tions: fi : 2
X −→ 2X , for i = 1, 2. The coherent choice function fi describes the
collective preferences of side i. They are obtained from the individual choice
functions of agents of side i by Equation (1) and are coherent by Theorem 1.
Note that, contrary to [15], no structure is assumed on the set X of contracts:
a contract is always between side 1 and side 2, we can forget the individuals
involved since the individuals preferences have been taken into account in the
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collective preferences expressed by f1 and f2. Note also that the situation con-
sidered here is that of many-to-many matching: both sides may enter multiple
contracts. Roth’s [26] and Blair’s [7] already considered such a symmetric sit-
uation and the topic has attracted a lot of attention recently, see [12, 13, 14].
Those works assume that preferences are defined by utilities, i.e., a total order
on the sets of contracts.
The basic situation is the following. Both sides wish to agree on a set of
contracts, a subset of X . If a tentative agreement, i.e., a subset of X , is on the
table, each side may, if it wishes to, and without any need for a permission from
the other side, reject any subset of the tentative agreement but the permission
of both sides is necessary before a contract or a number of contracts can be
added to a tentative agreement. This leads to the following definitions.
To help the reader’s intuition we shall mention basic properties of the notions
defined in Propositions without proofs. No proposition will be used in the sequel
and all propositions follow from the results in Section 8.
6.2 Agreements
An agreement is a set no contract from which will be taken away by any of the
two parties.
Definition 3 A set A of contracts is said to be an agreement iff A = f1(A) =
f2(A), i.e., it is a fixpoint for both f1 and f2.
In a sense, an agreement is a small set of contracts. The proposition below
follows from Lemma 6.
Proposition 1 The empty set is an agreement. If A is an agreement and
B ⊆ A, then B is an agreement.
Note that the union of two agreements is not in general an agreement.
In the marriage problem one easily sees that an agreement is a partial match-
ing: A is an agreement iff for each man i there is at most one contract of the
form (i, j) in A and for each woman j there is at most one contract of the form
(i, j) in A. There may be unmatched agents. The explanation is that if an agent
had two or more contracts in A he or she would prefer to throw all of them away
except one as implied by the definition of the choice function fi in Section 5.2.
6.3 Stable sets
A stable set is a set of contracts to which no addition is supported by both sides.
Definition 4 A set A of contracts is said to be a stable set iff for any contract
x ∈ X −A, x /∈ f1(A ∪ {x}) ∩ f2(A ∪ {x}).
In a sense, a stable set is a large set of contracts. The following proposition
follows straightforwardly from Lemma 3. Remember f1 and f2 are coherent.
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Proposition 2 The set X is a stable set. If A is a stable set, then any B such
that A ⊆ B is a stable set.
Note that the intersection of two stable sets is not, in general, a stable set.
In the marriage problem a set A is stable iff there is no pair (i, j) that is
not a member of A such that i prefers j to all the ws such that (i, w) ∈ A and
j prefers i to all the m’s such that (m, j) ∈ A. This corresponds exactly to the
notion of stability in the marriage environment.
6.4 Stable agreements
We can now formalize our notion of a solution.
Definition 5 A set A of contracts is said to be a stable agreement iff it is an
agreement and it is a stable set.
A stable agreement is a set of contracts from which no agent would like to
reject a contract and no two agents would agree to keep an additional contract
between them if offered. In the marriage problem a stable agreement is exactly
a stable matching. We may now define the agreement problem in general.
Definition 6 The agreement problem is the following: given a finite set X and
two coherent choice functions on X, f1 and f2, find a stable agreement, i.e., a
set A ⊆ X such that f1(A) = f2(A) = A and there is no x ∈ X −A such that
x ∈ f1({x} ∪ A) ∩ f2({x} ∪ A).
7 An algorithm for the agreement problem
7.1 The algorithm
We shall now offer a general solution to the agreement problem presented in
Definition 6. The algorithm is an iterative one that builds a sequence of sets of
contracts: Zj , j ≥ 0. The first element of the sequence: Z0 is taken to be equal
to X , the set of all contracts. The sequence is then defined by:
Zj+1 = (Zj − f1(Zj)) ∪ f2(f1(Zj)). (2)
The initial set of contracts on the table is Z0 = X . Then the process proceeds
in stages in the following manner: side 1 picks its preferred contracts from the
pool and side 2 picks from this set, providing the set of contracts picked by side
1 and accepted, i.e., not rejected by side 2. This set is put back on the table
with all contracts not picked up by side 1 and the process goes into another
similar stage. Note that, in the process, all contracts rejected by side 1 are left
on the table for the next stage, therefore it is only side 2 that rejects contracts.
We shall see below in Lemma 16 that indeed side 2 shall like side 1’s offers more
and more, i.e., side 2 prefers f1(Zj+1) to f1(Zj).
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Lemma 1 If f1 and f2 satisfy Contraction, then the sequence Zj of sets of
contracts is a decreasing sequence, i.e., Zj+1 ⊆ Zj for any j ≥ 0 and there is an
index f ≥ 0 such that Zf = Zf+1.
Proof: For the first claim:
Zj+1 = (Zj − f1(Zj) ∪ f2(f1(Zj)) ⊆ Zj ∪ f1(Zj) ⊆ Zj ∪ Zj .
The second claim holds since X is finite.
In the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm: the set of matches that have
not yet been rejected (by a woman) decreases (weakly).
We shall prove in the upcoming sections that the set S = f1(Zf ) is a stable
agreement. We shall also show that S is, in some sense, preferred to any stable
agreement by side 1.
7.2 A special case: Gale-Shapley
In the marriage problem, the iterative process just described parallels the Gale-
Shapley algorithm in which side 1 is the proposing side, i.e., the side that makes
the first move. Z0 = X is the set of all possible couples. The set f1(Z0)
in Equation (2) is the set of pairs (i, j) where j is the partner best preferred
by i: this describes exactly the first step of the Gale-Shapley process: agents
of side 1 gathering each around the agent of the other side that they prefer
among all others. The set f2(f1(Z0)) describes exactly the second step of the
process: each agent of side 2 around which gathered a non-empty set of agents
from side 1 chooses the one it prefers amongst those gathered, i.e., it rejects all
but the prefered one. The definition of Z1 says that it contains all contracts
of X except those rejected by side 2 in the last step. This parallels the fact
that, in the upcoming stages of the Gale-Shapley process all pairings are still
possible except those pairings that were just rejected by the agents of side 2.
We have seen that, when applied to the marriage situation and when Z0 = X
Equation (2) describes exactly the Gale-Shapley process.
7.3 Computational complexity
The algorithm described in Section 7.1 is conceptually straightforward and ele-
gant, but is it efficient from the computational point of view? The answer is: it
is remarkably efficient. Note that, by Lemma 1 the number of steps, f , of the
algorithm is at most the size of the set of contracts X . The algorithm finds a
subset of X with certain properties and a dumb algorithm would consider each
subset of X and check whether it satisfies the properties or not: this requires a
number of operations of the order of 2|X|, i.e., exponential in the size of X . Our
algorithm requires only a linear number of operations in the size of X . How
large is X? Considering the discussion in Section 5, the set X will be something
like the Cartesian product I × J × T of the set of agents on one side by the
set of agents on the other side by the set of items that can be traded. The
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considerations in Section 9 show that this may be multiplied by a finite set of
prices, but, all in all, the size of X is polynomial in the size of the data that de-
fines the problem. This stands in contradistinction with algorithms for finding
a competitive equilibrium: in [23] the authors showed that finding an efficient
allocation requires exponential communication. For finding a stable agreement
a polynomial number of applications of the choice functions is enough.
8 Properties of the algorithm
The purpose of this section is to study the properties of the sequence of Zj’s
above to prove that S is a stable agreement and study the structure of stable
agreements. To this purpose a significant mathematical apparatus is required.
Section 8.1 develops the theory of coherent choice functions. To any coherent
choice function f it associates a partial pre-order ≤f expressing the preferences
revealed by f . Section 8.2 analyzes the iterative process defined in Section 7
in terms of the partial pre-orders ≤f1 and ≤f2 . It shows that the algorithm
produces a stable agreement. Section 8.3 studies the properties of the partial
pre-order defined in Section 8.1 on stable agreements. Section 8.4 shows that the
set S above is a stable agreement preferred by side 1 to any stable agreement.
Section 8.5 proves that the set of stable agreements has a lattice structure.
8.1 Properties of coherent choice functions
Section 8.1.1 presents the elementary properties of coherent choice functions.
None of the results presented there are original. The most important result
is C. Plott’s Lemma 7. A rapid overview may be enough for a first reading.
Section 8.1.2 defines the partial pre-order associated with a coherent choice
function, first considered by C. Blair. This is a fundamental tool in the sequel.
Section 8.1.3 is devoted to the proof of an original technical result that will be
used only in Section 8.5 and its reading may be postponed.
8.1.1 First properties
First, IRC is equivalent to the Local Monotonicity property studied in [20].
Lemma 2 The IRC property is equivalent to:
Local Monotonicity− LM if f(A) ⊆ B ⊆ A, then f(B) ⊆ f(A).
Proof: To show that IRC implies LM, reason by induction on the size of A−B.
IfA = B, LM holds. Let x ∈ A−B. Assume f(A) ⊆ B ⊆ A then x ∈ A− f(A),
f(A− {x}) ⊆ f(A) and we have f(A− {x}) ⊆ B ⊆ A− {x}. We conclude by
the induction hypothesis.
Now assume LM and let x ∈ A− f(A). We have f(A) ⊆ A− {x} ⊆ A and
f(A− {x}) ⊆ f(A).
The next lemma shows that our definition of the Substitutes property is
equivalent to the corresponding formulation in [33, 15]
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Lemma 3 A choice function f satisfies the Substitutes condition iff it satisfies
one of the three following, equivalent,properties:
1. for any B ⊆ A ⊆ X and for any x ∈ X, if x ∈ f({x} ∪ A), then one has
x ∈ f({x} ∪B),
2. if B ⊆ A ⊆ X, B ∩ f(A) ⊆ f(B),
3. for any x ∈ B ⊆ A ⊆ X, if x /∈ f(B) then x /∈ f(A).
Proof:
1. Let us show that Substitutes implies property 1. If we have B ⊆ A and
x ∈ f({x} ∪ A), then {x} ∪B ⊆ {x} ∪ A and, since x ∈ {x} ∪B, by Sub-
stitutes we have x ∈ f({x} ∪B).
2. Assume property 1 and let B ⊆ A, x ∈ B ∩ f(A). We have {x} ∪ A = A
and x ∈ f({x} ∪ A). By property 1, x ∈ f({x} ∪B), but {x} ∪B = B.
3. We prove now that property 2 implies property 3. Assume property 2,
x ∈ B ⊆ A and x /∈ f(B). We have B ∩ f(A) ⊆ f(B) and therefore we
have x /∈ B ∩ f(A). But x ∈ B and x /∈ f(A).
4. Let us, finally, show that property 3 implies Substitutes. Assume prop-
erty 3, x ∈ B ⊆ A and x ∈ f(A). By contraposition property 3 implies
x ∈ f(B).
The next results use all three properties of Definition 1.
Lemma 4 If f is coherent then, for any A,B ⊆ X:
• (Cumulativity) if f(A) ⊆ B ⊆ A, then f(B) = f(A), and
• (Idempotence) f(f(A)) = f(A).
Proof: For Cumulativity, the assumptions imply, by Lemma 2, that f(B) ⊆
f(A), and by Lemma 3 f(A) = B ∩ f(A) ⊆ f(B). For Idempotence, note that
f(A) ⊆ f(A) ⊆ A and conclude by Cumulativity.
Lemma 5 If f is coherent, then f(A ∪B) ⊆ f(A) ∪ f(B).
Proof: By Contraction: f(A ∪B) = (A ∩ f(A ∪B)) ∪ (B ∩ f(A ∪B)). By
Lemma 3, A ∩ f(A ∪B) ⊆ f(A) and B ∩ f(A ∪B) ⊆ f(B).
The sets A of contracts that are fixpoints of f , i.e., such that f(A) = A are
particularly interesting. Our next result shows that any subset of a fixpoint is
a fixpoint.
Lemma 6 If f is coherent, B ⊆ A ⊆ X and f(A) = A, then f(B) = B.
15
Proof: By assumption B ⊆ A and Lemma 3 implies B ∩ f(A) ⊆ f(B) but
f(A) = A, B ∩ f(A) = B and B ⊆ f(B). We conclude by Contraction.
The next lemma is a powerful result of C. Plott [24] and expresses what he
calls Path Independence. It is presented there in a Social Choice context where
the elements of X are not contracts but possible social outcomes. A preferred
set of social outcomes contains all individually preferred outcomes and not, as
in this work, a set preferred to other sets, as already noticed in [15] (see footnote
4). For completeness sake a proof is provided.
Lemma 7 (C. Plott, Path Independence) A function f is coherent iff it
satisfies Contraction and one of the two equivalent conditions below, for any
A,B ⊆ X:
1. f(A ∪B) = f(f(A) ∪B),
2. f(A ∪B) = f(f(A) ∪ f(B)).
Proof: First, notice that condition 1 implies f(B ∪ f(A)) = f(f(B) ∪ f(A))
and therefore implies condition 2. Then, notice that condition 2 implies Idem-
potence: f(A) = f(A ∪A) = f(f(A) ∪ f(A)) = f(f(A)). Therefore it implies
that f(f(A) ∪ f(B)) = f(f(f(A)) ∪ f(B)) = f(f(A) ∪B) and therefore implies
condition 1.
Suppose now that f is coherent. By Lemma 5 and Contraction f(A ∪B) ⊆
f(A) ∪ f(B) ⊆ f(A) ∪B ⊆ A ∪B. By Cumulativity in Lemma 4 we conclude
that f(f(A) ∪B) = f(A ∪B). We have shown that f satisfies condition 1.
Let now f satisfy Contraction and condition 1. Assume f(A) ⊆ B ⊆ A. We
have
f(B) = f(f(A) ∪B) = f(A ∪B) = f(A)
and Local Monotonicity is satisfied. By Lemma 2 we conclude that f satisfies
Irrelevance of rejected contracts. If, now, B ⊆ A we have
f(A) = f(B ∪ (A−B)) = f(f(B) ∪ (A−B)) ⊆ f(B) ∪ (A−B).
We see that B ∩ f(A) ⊆ f(B). By Lemma 3 we have shown that f satisfies
Substitutes. We have shown that f is coherent.
8.1.2 The partial pre-order induced by a coherent choice function
We shall now show that any coherent choice function induces a partial pre-order
≤f on the set 2X .
The choice function f naturally defines a preference relation between sets of
contracts. A set A is preferred by f to a set B if the best subset of A ∪ B is
f(A), i.e., if the addition of B to A does not make the agent change her mind in
any way: she will stick to f(A). This relation has been considered by Blair [7]
in his Definition 4.1.
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Definition 7 Let f be a coherent choice function and A,B ⊆ X. We shall say
that, from the point of view of f , A is preferable to B and write B ≤f A iff
f(A ∪B) = f(A). We shall say that f is indifferent between A and B and write
A ∼f B iff B ≤f A and A ≤f B.
The reader should note that the relation ≤f is a very demanding one:
B ≤f A requires that the contracts of B do not provide any advantage over
those of A: if B is available in addition to A the elements of B that are not in
A will not be used at all. This demanding character of ≤f implies that a claim
such as the claim in Theorem 3 that any stable agreement A is less preferred
than a specific set S is a powerful claim. If f is defined by a v-substitutes val-
uation v as in Appendix A the partial pre-order ≤f is not the total pre-order
defined by the valuation function. True, if B ≤f A one has v(B) ≤ v(A) but
the converse does not hold.
From now on, all choice functions considered are assumed to be coherent
and the assumption that f is coherent will not be mentioned explicitly.
In the marriage problem, a man i prefers a set A ⊆ Xi of contracts to a set
B ⊆ Xi iff the most preferred woman in A is (weakly) preferred to the most
preferred woman in B, the empty set being less preferred than any set. Note
that, in this specific situation, the ≤i relation for man i is a total order. This
is not the case in general.
The following provides equivalent definitions.
Lemma 8 B ≤f A iff f(A ∪B) ⊆ f(A) iff f(A ∪B) ⊆ A.
Proof: The only parts are obvious. Suppose now that f(A ∪B) ⊆ A. We have
f(A ∪B) ⊆ A ⊆ A ∪B and by Cumulativity we have f(A) = f(A ∪B).
We proceed to study the properties of this binary relation.
Lemma 9 For any B ⊆ A ⊆ X:
1. B ≤f A,
2. the relation ≤f is reflexive,
3. A ∼f f(A).
Proof: By Definition 7. By the previous claim. By Lemma 7.
Lemma 10 A ∼f B iff f(A) = f(B) and therefore the relation ∼f is an equiv-
alence relation.
Proof: If A ∼f B we have f(A ∪B) = f(A) and f(A ∪B) = f(B). We con-
clude that f(A) = f(B).
Assume that f(A) = f(B). By Lemma 5 we have f(A ∪B) ⊆ f(A) ∪ f(B) =
f(A) = f(B). Conclude by Lemma 8.
Note that ≤f does not satisfy the antisymmetry property: B ≤f A and
A ≤f B does not imply A = B, and, therefore, is not a partial order.
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Lemma 11 If C ≤f B and B ≤f A then C ≤f A, i.e., the relation ≤f is tran-
sitive.
Proof: By Path Independence (Lemma 7) and our assumptions:
f(C ∪ A) = f(C ∪ f(A)) = f(C ∪ f(B ∪ A)) = f(C ∪B ∪ A) =
f(f(C ∪B) ∪ A) = f(f(B) ∪ A) = f(B ∪A) = f(A).
We see that, if f is coherent, the relation ≤f is a partial pre-order, also
called partial quasi-order.
The following lemma extends the Substitutes property to the case B ≤f A,
instead of B ⊆ A.
Lemma 12 Let A,B ⊆ X be such that B ≤f A. If x ∈ f({x} ∪ A) then x ∈
f({x} ∪B).
Proof: By Path Independence, Definition 7, and Path Independence again:
f({x} ∪ A ∪B) = f({x} ∪ f(A ∪B)) = f({x} ∪ f(A)) = f({x} ∪ A).
But, by Substitutes, x ∈ f({x} ∪ A ∪B) implies x ∈ f({x} ∪B).
8.1.3 The operation If
The following will prove useful in Section 8.5
Definition 8 For any A ⊆ X we define
If (A) = A ∪ {x ∈ X −A | x /∈ f({x} ∪ A)}. (3)
The properties of the operation I are described below. Note, in particular,
item 8 that expresses the preference relation ≤f in terms of set containment
and the operation If .
Lemma 13 For any A,B ⊆ X
1. if A ⊆ B then If (A) ⊆ If (B),
2. f(If (A)) = f(A),
3. If (If (A)) = If (A),
4. If (A) ∼f A,
5. If (f(A)) = If (A),
6. f(A ∪ If (B)) = f(A ∪B),
7. If (A ∩B) ⊆ If (A) ∩ If (B),
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8. A ≤f B iff A ⊆ If (B).
Proof:
1. Let A ⊆ B. For any x ∈ X −B, by Lemma 3, x /∈ f({x} ∪ A) implies
x /∈ f({x} ∪B). Therefore
C = {x ∈ X −A | x /∈ f({x} ∪ A)} ⊆
(B −A) ∪ {x ∈ X −B | x /∈ f({x} ∪B)} = D
and
If (A) = A ∪ C ⊆ B ∪D = If (B).
2. Let x ∈ f(If (A)) −A. Since A ⊆ If (A), by Lemma 3, x ∈ f({x} ∪A),
contradicting x ∈ If (A). We see that f(If (A)) ⊆ A and we conclude by
Cumulativity.
3. By Lemma 5, Contraction and item 2 above we have
f({x}∪If (A)) ⊆ {x}∪f(If (A)) = {x}∪f(A) ⊆ {x}∪A ⊆ {x}∪If (A).
By Lemma 4 we conclude that f({x} ∪ If (A)) = f({x} ∪A). Therefore
for any x ∈ If (If (A)) − If (A), we have x /∈ f({x} ∪A) and x ∈ If (A),
a contradiction. We have shown that If (If (A)) ⊆ If (A). By definition
If (A) ⊆ If (If (A)).
4. By item 2 and Lemma 10.
5. We distinguish three cases. First, for any x ∈ f(A), x ∈ If (f(A)) and
x ∈ If (A). Secondly, for any x ∈ A− f(A), x ∈ If (A). Let us show that
x ∈ If (f(A)). By Path Equivalence, for any x ∈ A− f(A), x ∈ If (f(A))
iff x /∈ f({x} ∪ f(A)) = f({x} ∪ A) = f(A). We see that x ∈ If (f(A)).
Thirdly, for any x ∈ X −A, x ∈ If (f(A))) iff x /∈ f({x} ∪ f(A)) and x ∈
If (A) iff x /∈ f({x} ∪ A) and the two conditions are equivalent, by Path
Equivalence.
6. By Lemma 5, item 2 above and Contraction
f(A∪ If (B)) ⊆ f(A)∪ f(If (B)) = f(A)∪ f(B) ⊆ A∪B ⊆ A∪ If (B).
We conclude by Cumulativity.
7. Let x ∈ If (A ∩B). If, on one hand, x ∈ A ∩B then clearly x ∈ If (A ∩B).
If, on the other hand, x ∈ X −A ∩B then x /∈ f({x} ∪A ∩B), there-
fore, by Lemma 3, x /∈ f({x} ∪ A) and x /∈ f({x} ∪B). Whether x ∈ A
or x ∈ X −A, x ∈ If (A) and similarly x ∈ If (B).
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8. We use Lemma 8. Assume f(A ∪B) ⊆ B and x ∈ A. We have
f(A ∪B) ⊆ {x} ∪B ⊆ A ∪B
and by Lemma 4 also f({x} ∪B) = f(A ∪B). If x ∈ B then x ∈ If (B),
but if x ∈ A−B, we have x /∈ f({x} ∪B) and therefore x ∈ If (B). We
have shown that A ⊆ If (B). Assume now that A ⊆ If (B). By Lemma 9,
then, and by item 4 above we have A ≤f If (B) ∼f B and we conclude by
Lemma 11.
8.2 Properties of the iterative process
We may already see that the end product of our iterative process, the set
S = f1(Zf ) is an agreement.
Lemma 14 The set S is an agreement.
Proof: By Lemma 4, f1 is idempotent and f1(S) = f1(f1(Zf )) = f1(Zf ) =
S. By construction Zf = Zf+1 = (Zf − f1(Zf )) ∪ f2(f1(Zf )) and therefore
f1(Zf ) ⊆ f2(f1(Zf )) and, by Contraction we conclude that f1(Zf ) = f2(f1(Zf ))
i.e., S = f2(S).
We shall now proceed step by step in the analysis of the iterative process
described in Equation (2) and gather all the results in Theorem 3 below. We
have seen in Lemma 1 that the sequence Zj is decreasing.
An offer of side 1, i.e., a contract in f1(Zj), that has been accepted by side
2 will always be offered again by side 1.
Lemma 15 For any j, j ≥ 0,
f2(f1(Zj)) ⊆ f1(Zj+1).
Proof: Since Zj+1 ⊆ Zj , by Lemma 3, we have Zj+1 ∩ f1(Zj) ⊆ f1(Zj+1). But,
Zj+1 ∩ f1(Zj) = f2(f1(Zj)) by Equation (2).
In the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm: a man chosen by a woman
at stage j, will still be available for her at stage j + 1.
The result below is a central part of our analysis. From the point of view of
side 2, the offers of side 1 get better and better.
Lemma 16 For any j ≥ 0, f1(Zj) ≤2 f1(Zj+1).
Proof: By Lemma 8, it is enough to show f2(f1(Zj) ∪ f1(Zj+1)) ⊆ f1(Zj+1).
By Lemma 5, we have: f2(f1(Zj) ∪ f1(Zj+1)) ⊆ f2(f1(Zj)) ∪ f2(f1(Zj+1)). We
conclude by Lemma 15 and Contraction.
In the Gale-Shapley algorithm: after stage j + 1 a woman is either left in the
same situation she was after stage j or she has a better (for her) mate.
Our next result is central towards showing that S is a stable set.
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Lemma 17 For any j ≥ 0, if x ∈ Zj − Zj+1, then, for any k > j, one has
x /∈ f2({x} ∪ f1(Zk)) and in particular x /∈ f2({x} ∪ S).
Proof: Let x ∈ Zj − Zj+1. We have x ∈ f1(Zj)− f2(f1(Zj)) and therefore
x /∈ f2({x} ∪ f1(Zj)). But, by Lemmas 16 and 11, f1(Zj) ≤2 f1(Zk). Lemma 12
then implies that x /∈ f2({x} ∪ f1(Zk)).
In the Gale-Shapley algorithm: a woman who has rejected a man at some
point will never wish to be matched with him at some later point.
We may now state:
Lemma 18 The set S is a stable agreement.
Proof: Lemma 14 showed that S is an agreement. Let now x ∈ X − S. We dis-
tinguish two cases. On one hand, if x ∈ Zf , x ∈ Zf − f1(Zf ). But, by Lemma 7,
f1({x} ∪ f1(Zf )) = f1({x} ∪ Zf) = f1(Zf ). We conclude that x /∈ f1({x} ∪ S).
On the other hand, if x ∈ X − Zf , there is a j ≥ 0 such that x ∈ Zj − Zj+1. By
Lemma 17, then, x /∈ f2({x} ∪ S). We have shown that S is a stable set.
8.3 Ordering agreements and stable sets
We need to prove some basic properties of stable sets before we can prove that
S is the stable agreement preferred by side 1. By Definition 4 both sides cannot
agree to add any contract to a stable set. We shall show now that both sides
cannot agree to add any set of contracts to a stable set.
Lemma 19 If A is a stable set, then, for any B ⊆ X,
f1(A ∪B) ∩ f2(A ∪B) ⊆ A.
Proof: Assume x ∈ f1(A ∪B) ∩ f2(A ∪B)−A. By Contraction x ∈ B and by
Substitutes we have x ∈ f1(A ∪ {x}) ∩ f2(A ∪ {x}), contradicting our assump-
tion that A is a stable set.
Our next result compares the two partial pre-orders f1 and f2. In the sequel
addition has to be understood as addition modulo 2: 2 + 1 = 1. If side i prefers
a set B to a stable agreement A, then the other side (i+ 1) prefers A to fi(B).
Lemma 20 Let A,B ⊆ X. If A is a stable set and A ≤i B, then fi(B) ≤i+1 A.
Proof: Assume A ≤i B. By Lemmas 9 and 11, A ≤i fi(B), and, by Definition 7
and Idempotence, fi(A ∪ fi(B)) = fi(B). Since A is a stable set, by Lemma 19,
fi(A ∪ fi(B)) ∩ fi+1(A ∪ fi(B)) ⊆ A.
We see that
fi(B) ∩ fi+1(A ∪ fi(B)) ⊆ A,
and therefore
fi+1(A ∪ fi(B)) ⊆ A ∪ (X − fi(B)).
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By Contraction, then, we see that
fi+1(A ∪ fi(B)) ⊆ (A ∪ (X − fi(B))) ∩ (A ∪ fi(B))
and we conclude that fi+1(A ∪ fi(B)) ⊆ A. We conclude, by Lemma 8, that
fi(B) ≤i+1 A.
It follows that ≤1 and ≤2 are just inverse relations on stable agreements,
which is a striking property of stable matchings.
Corollary 1 If A and B are stable agreements, then A ≤i B iff B ≤i+1 A.
Proof: By Lemma 20 since A and B are agreements.
Let us also notice that, on stable agreements, the partial pre-orders ≤i
i = 1, 2 are anti-symmetric and therefore partial orders.
Theorem 2 Among stable agreements the relations ≤i, for i = 1, 2, are partial
order relations.
Proof: Lemmas 9 and 11 proved the relations are reflexive and transitive. We
are left to prove that if A and B are stable agreements, A ≤i B and B ≤i A,
then A = B. Indeed one has fi(A ∪B) = f(B) = B and fi(B ∪A) = f(A) = A.
8.4 An extremal property
Our next result is central towards showing that S is preferred by side 1 to any
stable agreement. In particular, Lemma 21 shows that any stable agreement is
a subset of Zf .
Lemma 21 Let A be a stable set of contracts such that f2(A) = A. Then,
A ⊆ Zi for any i ≥ 0. In particular A ⊆ Zf , and therefore any stable agreement
is a subset of Zf .
Proof: Assume that A is a stable set and that f2(A) = A. We reason by
induction on i. Clearly A ⊆ Z0 = X. Assume that A ⊆ Zi. By Lemma 9 we
have A ≤1 Zi and by Lemma 20, f1(Zi) ≤2 A, i.e., f2(f1(Zi) ∪ A) = f2(A) = A.
But f1(Zi) ⊆ f1(Zi) ∪ A and, by Lemma 3, we have f1(Zi) ∩ f2(f1(Zi) ∪ A) ⊆
f2(f1(Zi)). Therefore f1(Zi) ∩ A ⊆ f2(f1(Zi)). But A ⊆ Zi and we conclude
that A ⊆ Zi+1, by Equation (2).
We can now show that S is preferred by side 1 to any stable agreement. We
summarize what we know on the set S.
Theorem 3 The set S of contracts is a stable agreement and for any stable
agreement A one has A ≤1 S and S ≤2 A.
Proof: The set S is a stable agreement by Lemmas 14 and 18. Let A be any
stable agreement. By Lemma 21 we have A ⊆ Zf . Therefore, by Lemma 9 A ≤1
Zf ∼1 S and by Lemma 11 we conclude that A ≤1 S. By Corollary 1, S ≤2 A.
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8.5 The lattice of stable agreements
We shall now show that the set of all stable agreements exhibits a lattice struc-
ture with respect to the partial orders ≤i for i = 1, 2. Remember that those
relations are partial orders on the family of stable agreements by Theorem 2.
The result below is a direct benefit of the absence of any structural assump-
tion on X . We can easily characterize sets of contracts that are less preferred
than each of two other sets of contracts. The operation I has been defined in
Equation (3). We write Ii for Ifi , for i = 1, 2.
Lemma 22 Let A,B,C ⊆ X and let i = 1, 2. We have A ≤i B and A ≤i C iff
A ⊆ Ii(B) ∩ Ii(C).
Proof: By Lemma 13, property 8, we have A ≤i B iff A ⊆ Ii(B) and A ≤i C
iff A ⊆ Ii(C).
In the sequel we shall consider only the case i = 1 and therefore we set, for
any B,C ⊆ X :
WCB = I1(B) ∩ I1(C). (4)
Our goal is to find, for any pair of stable agreements B and C, a stable
agreement D less preferred by side 1 than B and C, but such that any stable
agreement less preferred by side 1 than B and C is also less preferred than D.
Since we have just seen that any set of contracts less preferred than both B and
C by side 1 is a subset of WCB , it is natural to consider executing the iterative
process of Section 7 when the set of contracts considered is WCB , not X .
Let;
ZW0 = W
C
B , Z
W
j+1 = (Z
W
j − f1(Z
W
j )) ∪ f2(f1(Z
W
j )), Z
W
g = Z
W
g+1.
We shall prove that SW = f1(Z
W
g ) satisfies our goals. Note that since the itera-
tive process is exactly the one described in Section 7, we may apply Theorem 3,
with paying attention to the fact that the set of contracts is now WCB , not X .
The following is almost immediate and does not require that B and C be stable
agreements: they can be any sets. But note that we have to deal now with
two different notions of stability: stability with respect to X and stability with
respect to WCB . A set A is stable with respect to W
C
B iff for every x ∈W
C
B −A
x /∈ f1(A ∪ {x}) ∩ f2(A ∪ {x}). A set stable with respect to X is stable with
respect to WCB . In the sequel when we write stable without qualification, we
mean stable with respect to X .
Lemma 23 The set SW is an agreement, SW ≤1 B, SW ≤1 C and A ≤1 SW
for any stable agreement A such that A ≤1 B and A ≤1 C.
Proof: The set SW is an agreement by Theorem 3, since the definition of
an agreement does not depend on the base set, X or WCB . By construction
SW ⊆WCB and therefore Lemma 22 implies that S
W ≤1 B and SW ≤1 C. If
A is a stable agreement (with respect to X) such that A ≤1 B and A ≤1 C,
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by Lemma 22 it is a subset of WCB and it is a stable set with respect to W
C
B .
Therefore, by Theorem 3, A ≤1 SW .
The remainder of this section is devoted to showing that, if B and C are
stable agreements, then SW is a stable set. Note that Theorem 3 implies that
SW is stable relative toWCB , but we still have to show that for any x ∈ X −W
C
B ,
one has x /∈ f1({x} ∪ SW ) ∩ f2({x} ∪ SW ).
In the Gale-Shapley marriage situation, the greatest lower bound to stable
matches B and C is given by f2(B ∪C). The consideration of this set will help
even in the much more general situation we are faced with.
Lemma 24 If B and C are stable agreements, then f2(B ∪ C) ⊆ f1(WCB ).
Proof: We shall, first, show that f2(B ∪ C) ⊆WCB . Let x ∈ f2(B ∪C). By
Contraction x ∈ B ∪ C. Without loss of generality, let us assume that x ∈ B. By
Substitutes, then, x ∈ f2({x} ∪C ). If x ∈ C, we have x ∈ I1(B) ∩ I1(C) =WCB
and we are through. If x /∈ C, since C is a stable set, we have x /∈ f1({x} ∪C),
i.e., x ∈ I1(C), but x ∈ B ⊆ I1(B) and therefore x ∈W
C
B .
Now, we know that f2(B ∪C) ⊆WCB ∩ (B ∪ C). Since, by definition, W
C
B ⊆
I1(B), Lemma 3 imply that W
C
B ∩ f1(I1(B)) ⊆ f1(W
C
B ). But, by Lemma 13
part 2, f1(I1(B)) = f1(B) = B. Therefore W
C
B ∩B ⊆ f1(W
C
B ) and similarly
WCB ∩ C ⊆ f1(W
C
B ).
Theorem 4 Let B and C be any stable agreements. The set SW is a stable
agreement, SW ≤1 B, SW ≤1 C, and, for any stable agreement A such that
A ≤1 B and A ≤1 C, one has A ≤1 SW .
Proof: Except for the stability of SW , all claims have been proved in Lemma 23.
By Lemmas 9 and 24 we have
B ≤2 B ∪C ≤2 f2(B ∪ C) ≤2 f1(W
C
B ).
By Lemma 16 f1(W
C
B ) ≤2 f1(Z
W
g ) = S
W . Therefore, by Lemma 11 one has
B ≤2 SW . Similarly C ≤2 SW . We distinguish two cases. First, for any
x ∈ X −WCB , we may, without loss of generality, assume that x /∈ I1(B), i.e.,
x /∈ B and x ∈ f1({x} ∪B). Since B is a stable set, x /∈ f2({x} ∪B). Therefore,
by Lemma 12, since B ≤2 SW , we see that x /∈ f2({x} ∪ SW ). Secondly, for any
x ∈ WCB − S
W , Theorem 3 implies that x /∈ f1({x} ∪ S
W ) ∩ f2({x} ∪ S
W ). We
have proved that SW is a stable set.
9 Matching with contracts with money
One of the distinguishing features of matching among economic theory is that
it does not involve money, or, more precisely, does not assume the existence
of money. In this section we shall show that the many-to-many matching with
contracts framework, devoid of money, developed so far, also encompasses cer-
tain exchange economies with production. We shall, in particular study the
assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [35].
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9.1 Preferences with money
In the framework used so far, prices, if present, are hidden in the structure of
the set X of contracts. Since we want to study the role of prices in markets,
our first task is to take money out of the obscurity and bring it explicitly in
the framework. We also need to bring to the fore the terms of the contracts:
the item to be delivered and all the conditions that influence preferences since
we want to compare the prices of contracts with the same terms. We shall
therefore assume now that every contract x ∈ X specifies, not only a member
of I: xI and a member of J : xJ but also a price xP ∈ P and a template xT ∈ T
where P is a finite set of prices equipped with a total order (<) and T is a
finite set of templates. Note that, since X must be finite, we consider only a
finite set of possible prices: for example a natural number of cents less or equal
to a maximal price. A template, t ∈ T should be understood as containing
all relevant information about the item to be produced, its full specification,
packaging, time of delivery, place of delivery and so on, except the price and the
identity of the two contracting parties.
A contract x ∈ X represents a contract between producer xI and consumer
xJ for the production by xI of a specific item described in xT and the sale of
this item to xJ for an amount xP , to be transferred from xJ to xI . We shall use
the notations introduced in Definition 2: Xi, Xj and even define Xt and Xp in
a similar way.
The preferences of each agent a ∈ I ∪ J are described by a coherent choice
function fa : 2
Xa → 2Xa . It seems quite natural to assume that the consumers’
preferences are coherent, since, if we assume that a consumer’s preferences are
described by a v-substitutes valuation, then, by the results of Appendix A, it
can be described by a coherent choice function. To assume that the producers’
preferences are coherent is much more restrictive. It seems that a factory whose
operation produces two different chemicals A and B, may well accept a con-
tract to sell A and a contract to sell B if presented with two such contracts, but
reject a contract to sell A if there is no buyer for the by-product B. In other
terms producers often exhibit complementarities in their preferences. Similarly,
economies of scale in production translate in a choice function that is not coher-
ent. Nevertheless the preferences of a producer with linear costs of production
are described by a coherent choice function and we shall see in Section 10 that,
in the assignment game, the sellers, as well as the buyers, can be described by
coherent choice functions. A set of contracts X as above and coherent choice
functions fa for every agent a ∈ I ∪ J form an economy.
Since contracts are only potential trades, not realized trades, it is reasonable
to assume that there is no shortage of contracts. This assumption is formalized
below.
Definition 9 We say that an economy satisfies no-shortage of contracts iff
1. for any i ∈ I, j ∈ J , t ∈ T , and p ∈ P there is a contract x ∈ X such that
xI = i, xJ = j, xT = t and xP = p,
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2. for any contract x ∈ X and any stable agreement A ⊆ X such that x ∈ A,
there is a contract y ∈ X such that y /∈ A and yI = xI , yJ = xJ , yT = xT
and yP = xP .
In economies, since the money transfers are always from the consumer to the
producer, the preferences of the producers and the consumers concerning prices
are opposed: a producer always prefers higher prices and a consumer always
prefers lower prices. Another basic assumption is that a producer does not care
to whom he or she sells and a consumer does not care from whom he or she
buys. It is remarkable that those two basic facts can be modeled by suitable
restrictions on the respective choice functions. The correct formulation of the
property we are looking for requires some thinking.
Definition 10 An economy that satisfies no-shortage of contracts is said to
be a money-economy (m-economy) iff for any A ⊆ X, any x, y ∈ X such that
xT = yT and xP < yP ,
1. if i = xI = yI and x ∈ fi(A ∩Xi), then y ∈ fi((A ∩Xi) ∪ {y}), and
2. if j = xJ = yJ and y ∈ fj(A ∩Xj), then x ∈ fj((A ∩Xj) ∪ {x}).
For producer i, if he or she has the possibility to contract with j1 or with j2
(they may be the same consumer) at different prices, he or she can choose to
contract with both, or with none, but if he or she chooses to contract with only
one it must be for the higher price. Therefore, if, when offered the bundle A
that contains x he or she chooses to keep x, it must the case that he or she
will keep the higher priced contract y if such a contract is offered (in A or)
on top of A: either at the expense of rejecting the lower priced contract x, if
x /∈ fi((A ∩Xi) ∪ {y}), or by taking both contracts, if x, y ∈ fi((A ∩Xi) ∪ {y}).
Similarly, mutatis mutandis, for consumers.
9.2 Properties of stable agreements: a law of two prices
The results in previous Sections that concern matching with contracts are ap-
plicable to the special case of m-economies: we can define coherent collective
preferences for the producers: denoted by fI , coherent collective preferences for
the consumers: denoted fJ and the notion of a stable agreement. We can apply
the results above and claim that the set of stable agreements is not empty and
forms a lattice.
In a stable agreement any contract defines a price, so the agreement defines a
price for every traded item. Theorem 5 below shows that any stable agreement
in an m-economy defines a unit price for every commodity: a commodity is a
set of items that are indistinguishable by the agents. It is the discrete, revealed
preferences, version of the Law of one price much discussed in the literature: in
equilibrium all units of a given commodity are traded at the same price. The
result presented below extends significantly the laws of one price discussed in
the literature since it concerns stable agreements, not core elements. Note also
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that prices appear even in the absence of utilities. The price we have to pay for
our discrete, revealed preferences framework is that we cannot exclude that two
units of a commodity be traded at slightly different prices: we can only show
that if this happens those two prices are neighboring prices: there is no price
in-between.
In the framework of revealed preferences in which preferences are described
by choice functions the classical solution concepts such as competitive equilib-
rium, core elements or Pareto-optimal solutions cannot be defined in a straight-
forward manner since there is no obvious suitable notion of better satisfied, at
least no such notion that would compare any two situations: the binary re-
lation of Definition 7 seems too partial to be useful. Compared to Walrasian
equilibria or core elements, stable agreements represent imperfect equilibria, or
equilibria in imperfect markets. Note, though, that, in the assignment game (see
Section 10 below) core elements, stable agreements and competitive equilibria
almost coincide.
We can now state a Law of two prices for m-economies: in a stable agreement,
if different contracts that concern the same template t have different prices those
prices are neighboring prices: there is no price in-between those two prices. If
the prices are measured in cents, if the same item is sold at different prices, then
the prices can differ only by one cent.
Theorem 5 (Law of two prices) In an m-economy that satisfies no-shortage
of contracts, for any stable agreement A and contracts x, y ∈ A such that xT =
yT , the prices of those contracts are almost the same, i.e., there is no price
p ∈ P that is strictly between xP and yP .
Note that the producers xI and yI may be equal or different and similarly for
the consumers xJ and yJ , and therefore Theorem 5 describes a system-wide
property, not a local one.
Proof: We reason by contradiction. Assume that A ⊆ X is a stable agree-
ment, that x, y ∈ A are such that t = xT = yT and xP < p < yP . By no-
shortage of contracts, there is a contract z ∈ X such that zI = xI , zJ = yJ ,
zT = xT = yT and zP = p. Since A is an agreement, A = fI(A), x ∈ fI(A),
x ∈ fxI (A ∩Xi). But zI = xI , zT = xT , xP < zP and Definition 10 implies that
z ∈ fxI ((A ∩XI) ∪ {z}) and z ∈ fI(A ∪ {z}). Similarly, we have y ∈ fJ(A),
y ∈ fyJ (A ∩XJ), zJ = yJ , zT = yT , zP < yP and we have z ∈ fyJ (A ∪ {z}),
and z ∈ fJ(A ∪ {z}). But z ∈ fI(A ∪ {z}) ∩ fJ(A ∪ {z}) and A is a stable set
implies z ∈ A.
By no-shortage of contracts we conclude that there is contract z′ ∈ X such
that z′ /∈ A and z′I = zI , z
′
J = zJ , z
′
T = zT and z
′
P = zP . But the reasoning just
above about z carries over to z′ and we have z′ ∈ A. A contradiction.
Note that the assumption that the agents’ choice functions are coherent is
not used in the proof of Theorem 5. It only serves to ensure the existence of
stable agreements. The law of two prices is therefore applicable to imperfect
equilibria in a large family of economies.
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10 The assignment game
In [35] Shapley and Shubik study markets of a specific type. They define a coop-
erative game, an assignment game, to describe every such market. In such mar-
kets, three different solution concepts: competitive equilibrium, Pareto-optimal
outcome and the core elements of the associated game coincide. They show
that the core is not empty and that it has an elongated structure. Shapley and
Shubik noticed the similarities between the structure of the core of an assign-
ment game and the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings of a college
admission problem defined by Gale and Shapley: see footnote 2, p. 121 of [35].
Relying on the extension of matching theory to many-to-many matching with
contracts in the presence of money developed above, the sequel will show that
indeed the core of an assignment game and the stable matchings of the asso-
ciated m-economy are in one-to-one correspondence and have therefore exactly
the same structure: the elongated structure of the core is the lattice structure
of stable matchings.
In this Section, we associate an m-economy to every assignment game and
show that the core elements of the game are almost exactly the stable agreements
of the m-economy. This provides an alternative proof of the non-emptiness of
the core, but, more importantly, shows that the core has a lattice structure and
suggests that the notion of a stable matching is a solution concept worth of
studying in more general markets.
10.1 Description of the core
An assignment game is defined by a finite set I of sellers: each seller i ∈ I has
one house to sell and has a reserve price of ci, and a finite set J of buyers: each
buyer j ∈ J values the house of seller i at hi,j and is interested in buying at
most one house. A solution is a set of trades that guarantees that each house is
sold at most once, each buyer buys at most one house and no seller or buyer is
negatively affected.
Definition 11 A trade is a triple 〈i, j, p〉 where i ∈ I is a buyer, j ∈ J is a
seller and p is a price. It represents the sale of i’s house to j for a price of p.
A set A of trades is said to be a solution iff
1. for every i ∈ I there is at most one trade in A with seller i,
2. for every j ∈ J there is at most one trade in A with buyer j,
3. for every trade 〈i, j, p〉 ∈ A, ci ≤ p ≤ hi,j.
If A is a solution, i ∈ I, j ∈ J the gain of an agent from A is:
1. g(A, i) = p− ci if 〈i, j, p〉 ∈ A for some j ∈ J and g(A, i) = 0 otherwise,
2. g(A, j) = hi,j − p if 〈i, j, p〉 ∈ A and g(A, i) = 0 if there is no trade involv-
ing j in A.
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A solution A is in the core of the assignment game if there is no pair of seller
and buyer that could be better off by trading between themselves than trading
with the partners that A assigns to them. The following is proved in [35].
Theorem 6 A solution A is in the core iff any of the two following equivalent
properties hold:
1. Pareto optimality: for any solution B such that for any a ∈ I ∪ J one
has g(A, a) ≤ g(B, a), one has g(A, a) = g(B, a) for any a ∈ I ∪ J ,
2. No blocking coalition of size two: for any i ∈ I, J ∈ J one has
g(A, i) + g(A, j) ≥ hi,j − ci.
Definition 12 An assignment game is generic iff for every core element A,
every i ∈ I and j ∈ J who do not trade together in A, one has g(A, i) + g(A, j) >
hi,j − ci.
It is shown in [35] that if the linear program that maximizes the social welfare
in the assignment game has a unique solution (in the gains of the agents) then
the game is generic and that almost all games are generic.
10.2 The m-economy associated with an assignment game
Let us associate an m-economy to any assignment game. The set of producers
I is the set of sellers. The set of consumers J is the set of buyers. The set of
templates T is the set of houses. Since each seller owns exactly one house, we
can identify templates and sellers and take T = I. The set of prices P is a finite
totally ordered set that includes all ci’s, all hi,j ’s, their differences and enough
intermediate values: enough values so that the values that appear in the proof of
Theorem 7 are present. Note that in some contracts of X the seller sells a house
that he or she does not own. The choice functions will take care of excluding
those from agreements. We assume that the finite set X is large enough to
satisfy the no-shortage of contracts condition. We also assume a total ordering
on X that will help us solve ties in the definition of the choice functions.
The choice function fi : 2
Xi → 2Xi that describes the preferences of seller
i ∈ I satisfies the following requirements. Let B = {x ∈ A | xT = i, ci ≤ xP }
for any A ⊆ Xi.
• If B 6= ∅ then fi(A) is the singleton that contains the element of B that
presents the highest price among all contracts of B (in case of ties, use
the ordering on X), and
• if B = ∅, then fi(A) = ∅.
The choice function fj : 2
Xj → 2Xj that describes the preferences of buyer
j ∈ J satisfies the following requirements. LetB = {x ∈ A | xT = xI , xP ≤ hxI ,j}
for any A ⊆ Xj.
• If B 6= ∅ then fj(A) is the singleton that contains the element of B with
lowest price (in case of ties, use the ordering on X), and
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• if B = ∅, then fj(A) = ∅.
Note that an agent prefers to trade for a zero profit than not to trade.
One easily sees that the choice functions fa for a ∈ I ∪ J are coherent. The
results proved in previous sections show that in the m-economy associated to
any assignment game the set of stable agreements is not empty and has a lattice
structure.
10.3 Core elements and stable agreements
We now want to show that the stable agreements of the m-economy associated
with an assignment game are, in the generic case, in one-to-one correspondence
with the core elements of the game. The next result deals with agreements.
Lemma 25 The agreements of the m-economy associated with an assignment
game are exactly the solutions of the game.
Proof: Every agreement defines a solution as in Definition 11. Let A be an
agreement and x ∈ A. Let i = xI be the seller in x. We have x ∈ fi(A ∩Xi)
since A is an agreement. We conclude that xT = i since, in a preferred set
sellers sell only their own houses and we have ci ≤ xP . Let j = xJ . We have
x ∈ fj(A ∩XJ) since A is an agreement and therefore xP ≤ hi,j . We have shown
that the triple 〈xI , xJ , xP 〉 = t(x) is a trade. We want now to show that if A
is an agreement, the set of trades {t(x) | x ∈ A} is a solution. For i ∈ I, let
Ai = {x ∈ A | i = xI . Define Aj for j ∈ J in a similar way. Let i ∈ I, x ∈ Ai.
Since A is an agreement fi(Ai) = Ai. But fi(Ai) is either a singleton or empty.
Therefore Ai = {x}. We have proved the first part of Definition 11. The second
one is proved in a similar way. The third part follows from the definition of the
choice functions.
Every solution defines an agreement. One easily sees that to any solution
correspond agreements to which it is associated: for any trade 〈i, j, p〉, take
some contract x ∈ X such that xI = i, xJ = j and xP = p. The existence of
such a contract is guaranteed by the no-shortage of contracts condition. In the
sequel we shall always associate with a trade 〈i, j, p〉 the contract x that satisfies
the three conditions above and that is the most preferred one among contracts
satisfying these conditions in the total ordering we have assumed on contracts.
The relation between stable agreements and core elements hides a subtlety:
if stable agreements are always in the core, it is only for generic assignment
games (see Definition 12) that one can show that all core elements are stable
agreements.
Theorem 7 The stable agreements of the m-economy associated with an assign-
ment game are core solutions of the game and, for generic assignment games,
core solutions are stable agreements.
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Proof: First, we shall show that any stable agreement is in the core. We
shall show that any stable agreement is Pareto-optimal and conclude by The-
orem 6. Assume A and B are agreements such that for any a ∈ I ∪ J one has
g(A, a) ≤ g(B, a) and assume that b ∈ I ∪ J satisfies g(A, b) < g(B, b). We shall
show that A is not a stable set.
Notice, first, that 0 < g(B, b) and therefore there is a contract x ∈ B in
which b participates. Assume, first, that b ∈ I. The case b ∈ J will be treated
below. We have xI = b. Let c = xJ . We shall show that there is a contract
x′ ∈ X −A between b and c that both b and c would keep if presented with the
set A ∪ {x′}. There are two cases to be considered: either buyer c trades in A or
he does not trade. If c does not trade in A, we can take x′ = x: there is no y ∈ A
such that yJ = c, then A ∩Xc = ∅ and x ∈ fc((A ∩Xc) ∪ {x}) since xP ≤ hb,c.
Since g(A, b) < g(B, b) seller b would strictly gain by exchanging whatever he
or she gains in A for the trade x. This implies that x is not in A and that
x ∈ fb((A ∩Xb) ∪ {x}). We see that A is not a stable set.
If buyer c trades in A, let’s say with d in I, there is a y ∈ A such that yI = d
and yJ = c. We have
g(A, b) < g(B, b) = xP − cb.
We have defined the set P of prices in a way that guarantees the existence of a
price p′ such that
g(A, b) + cb < p
′ < xP .
The no-shortage of contracts assumption ensures the existence of a contract
x′ ∈ X such that x′I = b, x
′
J = c and x
′
P = p
′. The fact that g(A, b) < p′ − cb
implies that x′ /∈ A and that x′ ∈ fa((A ∩Xa) ∪ {x′}). The fact that
g(A, c) ≤ g(B, c) = hb,c − xP < hb,c − p
′
implies that x′ ∈ fb((A ∩Xb) ∪ {x′}). We conclude that A is not a stable set.
Assume, now, that a ∈ J is a buyer. The treatment is very similar, we sketch
the proof. We have xJ = b. Let c = xI . If seller c does not trade in A , we have
fc((A ∩Xc) ∪ {x}) = {x}. But, since g(A, b) < g(B, b), we see that x /∈ A and
that fb((A ∩Xb) ∪ {x}) = {x}. We conclude that A is not a stable set.
If seller c trades in A, let’s say with buyer d in J , there is a y ∈ A such that
yJ = d and yI = c. We have
g(A, a) < g(B, a) = hb,a − xP .
There is a price p′ such that
p < p′ < hb,a − g(A, a).
The no-shortage of contracts assumption ensures the existence of of a contract
x′ ∈ X such that x′I = c, x
′
J = b and x
′
P = p
′. The fact that g(A, a) < hb,a − p′
implies that x′ /∈ A and that x′ ∈ fa((A ∩Xa) ∪ {x′}). The fact that
g(A, b) ≤ g(B, b) = p− cb < p
′ − cb
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implies that x′ ∈ fb((A ∩Xb) ∪ {x′}). We conclude that A is not a stable set.
We have shown that any set that is not Pareto-optimal is unstable, we conclude,
by Theorem 6 and Lemma 25 that any stable agreement is in the core.
We are left to prove that any core element is a stable set, if the assignment
game is generic. Let A be a core element in a generic assignment game. We
associate with every trade in A a contract as in the last lines of the proof
of Lemma 25. Let A′ be the set of those contracts. The set A is a solution
and, therefore, by Lemma 25, A′ is an agreement. Let x ∈ X −A′ such that
xI = i, xJ = j. Since the assignment game is generic, for any i ∈ I, j ∈ J who
do not trade together in A, one has g(A′, i) + g(A′, j) > hi,j − ci. Therefore
either g(A′, i) > xP − ci and x /∈ fi((A′ ∩Xi) ∪ {x}) or g(A′, j) > hi,j − xP and
x /∈ fj((A′ ∩Xj) ∪ {x}). If i and j trade together in A there is a contract y ∈ A′
such that yI = i and yJ = j. If xP < yP , then x /∈ fi((A
′ ∩Xi) ∪ {x}) and if
yP < xP , then x /∈ fj((A′ ∩Xj) ∪ {x}. Finally, if xP = yP , since y ∈ A′ has
been chosen as the most preferred contract in X such that yI = i, yJ = j and
yP = p, we have x /∈ fi((A′ ∩Xi) ∪ {x}) and x /∈ fj((A′ ∩Xj) ∪ {x}.
10.4 Structure of the core of an assignment game
We have shown that, in a generic assignment game, the core is the set of stable
agreements of an agreement problem. It follows that the core has a lattice struc-
ture under the two converse relations defined in Definition 7. Those relations
are partial order relations on core elements as shown in Theorem 2.
One easily sees that the partial order ≤I that describes the preferences of
the buyers’ side is defined, among core elements, by A ≤I B iff for every i ∈ I,
g(A, i) ≤ g(B, i) and that A ≤I B iff B ≤J A. The lemma on p. 2 of [35] shows
that the lattice operations are as expected. The elongated direction of the core
is the relation ≤I .
Can there be two core elements that are unrelated in the ≤I relation? Yes,
consider a market composed of two submarkets in different areas, and suppose
that buyers are only interested in houses in one the areas. A situation in which
houses sellers have the upper hand in one area but buyers have it in the other
area defines a core element. A symmetric situation defines a core element un-
related to the first one with respect to ≤I . An interesting conjecture is that,
if the market is global: every buyer could in fact buy any house, then any two
core elements are related by ≤I . This conjecture is supported by the following
result on the assignment game.
Theorem 8 Let i, i′ ∈ I. If for any j ∈ J , hi,j = hi′,j, then, in any core el-
ement A if both houses i and i′ are sold, then they are sold at almost equal
prices, i.e., the two prices are neighbouring prices (see the discussion before
Theorem 5).
Proof: The two houses correspond to the same template and we can apply
Theorem 5.
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A stronger result can be proved directly: the two houses i and i′ are sold at
the same price. Suppose indeed that i is sold at pi to j, i
′ is sold at pi′ to
j′ and that pi < pi′ . We have g(A, i) = pi − ci and g(A, j′) = hi′,j′ − pi′ . We
conclude that g(A, i) + g(A, j′) < hi′,j′ − ci = hi,j′ − ci. A contradiction to the
assumption that A is in the core.
A special case of the assignment game, discussed in [35] is the case in which
all houses (in the original work of Bo¨hm-Bawerk the houses are horses) are
identical. In this case hi,j depends only on j and not on i and can be written
hj . In the description of the corresponding m-economy (see Section 10.2) there
is now only one template and by Theorem 5, in any core element, all the houses
that are sold fetch almost the same price. In fact, as noted above, they fetch
exactly the same price.
We have seen that, in the assignment game, core elements and stable agree-
ments coincide. Appendix C shows that this is an exceptional situation. In
general we expect to see stable agreements that are not in the core and not even
Pareto-optimal, and one may find core elements that are not stable.
11 Open problems and future work
Below is a list of questions that need further reflection.
1. It is quite remarkable that substitutes agents can be exactly characterized
by their choice functions. Can other typical types of behavior be char-
acterized this way and can the revealed preferences approach successfully
tackle other types of markets?
2. The study of the iterative process of Section 7 may be deepened. In
particular the question whether Lemma 24 can be strengthened is open.
Is the set f2(B ∪C) a subset of SW , is it equal to SW , as is the case in
one-to-many matching?
3. Suppose the preferences of each agent i on one side are described by a
v-substitutes valuation vi and the coherent choice function fi it defines as
in Appendix A. Is the collective coherent choice function of Equation 1
the choice function defined by the v-substitutes valuation that is the con-
volution, i.e.,
∨
i vi as in [19]?
4. Can one define useful families of coherent choice functions that possess
short representations?
5. One can easily formalize the restriction that an individual choice function
picks a unique best contract from any set of contracts. Can one similarly
characterize choice functions that represent collective preferences that ag-
gregate such preferences? Can one easily prove the particular properties
of one-to-one and one-to-many matchings by considering the iterative pro-
cess of Section 7?
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6. Does the lattice of stable agreements enjoy additional properties? Under
what conditions is it distributive?
7. Is the iterative process of Section 7 truthful? Can one of the sides benefit
from choosing a subset that is not its preferred subset?
8. Section 9.1 considered whether it was reasonable to assume that agents,
and in particular producers preferences are described by coherent choice
functions. The study of demand types proposed in [6] may probably be
used to classify choice functions and study classes of agents for which a
stable agreement is guaranteed to exist.
9. The stable agreements form a lattice. The situation of a stable agreement
on the axis defined by the preference relations ≤I and ≤J describes the
relative strengths of producers and consumers. But how can one compare
two stable agreements that are not related by those relations? Could price
changes move the market from one to another?
10. The algorithm presented in Section 7 obtains a stable agreement but does
not describe the way real markets behave in their way to some equilibrium
which is not necessarily a competitive equilibrium. One should study more
realistic ways in which an unstable agreement can evolve into a stable one.
12 Conclusion
Many-to-many matching can be treated in a pure revealed preferences frame-
work if the choice functions that describe the agents’ preferences are assumed
to be coherent. The collective preferences of each side are then described too by
coherent choice functions. A natural iterative process provides both an extremal
stable agreement and a proof of the lattice structure of stable agreements. Two-
sided markets in which agents’ preferences can be described by coherent choice
functions have a non-empty set of stable agreements and if there are competitive
equilibria they are in this set, but stable agreements exist in markets that lack
a competitive equilibrium. Stable agreements probably correspond to imperfect
market equilibria. Contrary to competitive equilibria, stable agreements are
easy to find and only polynomial-size information needs to be shared to find
one.
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A V-substitutes valuations and coherent func-
tions
We shall show that any valuation that is v-substitutes yields a coherent choice
function. We consider the most general valuations v : 2X → R. The value v(A)
may be negative, the function v is not necessarily monotone and v(∅) is not
necessarily equal to 0. The following generalizes the definition of Kelso and
Crawford in [16].
Definition 13 A valuation v : 2X →R is v-substitutes iff for any price vector
p : X →R, if we define up(A) = v(A) −
∑
x∈A p(x), and if we consider two
price vectors p1 and p2 such that p1 ≤ p2 and if A is a set of contracts that
maximizes up1 over all sets of contracts, then there is a set A
′ that maximizes
up2 over all sets of contracts that includes all contracts of A whose prices are
the same in p1 and p2. Note that prices may be negative.
We want to show that any v-substitutes valuation yields a corresponding
coherent choice function.
Theorem 9 Let v : 2X →R be any v-substitutes valuation. There is a coherent
choice function f : 2X → 2X such that, for any A ⊆ X, v(f(A)) ≥ v(B) for any
B ⊆ A.
Proof: The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we shall show there there is a
v-substitutes valuation v′ that is a perturbation of v that enjoys the uniqueness
property: any set A has a unique subset that maximizes v′, and that is such
that the v′ maximizing subset of any A is a v maximizing subset of A.
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Definition 14 A valuation v : 2X →R possesses the uniqueness property iff
for any A ⊆ X there is a unique B ⊆ A that maximizes v over all subsets of A.
The second step shows that any v-substitutes valuation that enjoys the
uniqueness property yields a suitable choice function. This result is not original.
Lemma 26 Let v be any valuation. One may find prices p that are small enough
such that, for every A, the subset that maximizes up is a subset that maximizes
v and such that up possesses the uniqueness property. If v is v-substitutes, so is
up.
Proof: Consider the number: m = minA,B⊆X{| v(A) − v(B) |} and choose
0 < ǫ < m|X| . Let us choose prices px, 0 ≤ px ≤ ǫ and let u(A) = v(A)−
∑
x∈A px.
The function u is v-substitutes, by the definition of v-substitutes. Note that,
for any A,B ⊆ X, u(A)− u(B) > v(A)− v(B) −m and therefore u(A) ≤ u(B)
implies v(A) < v(B). We conclude that the subset of A that maximizes u al-
ready maximized v. Now, the uniqueness property is not satisfied for all choices
of prices, but it is satisfied for almost all choices of prices since, if A 6= B and
v(A) = v(B), u(A) 6= u(B) unless some specific linear relation holds between
the prices px.
Lemma 27 If v : 2X →R is a v-substitutes valuation that possesses the unique-
ness property, then the choice function f : 2X → 2X defined by: f(A) is the
unique subset of A that maximizes v, is coherent.
Proof: Contraction and IRC follow directly from the definition. For Substi-
tutes, assume that x ∈ B ⊆ A and x ∈ f(A). Let p be a price vector with very
high prices for all contracts in X −A and zero prices on contracts in A. At
those prices the subset of A that maximizes up is f(A) and, by assumption,
it contains x. Let us now consider a price vector p′ in which all contracts in
A−B are very high, and all other contracts keep the price they had in p. Since
v is v-substitute, the subset of B that maximizes up′ contains every contract of
f(A) whose price has not been raised, in the move from p to p′. We see that
x is a member of this set. But this set is also the subset of B that maximizes
v among all subsets of B since elements of B have zero price in p′: it is f(B).
It has been shown, in Section 4.2, that valuations that are not v-substitutes
may also yield coherent choice functions.
B Another characterization of coherent choice
functions
The following is a characterization of coherent choice functions due to Aizerman
and Malishevski. The proof can be found in [2].
38
Lemma 28 (Aizerman and Malishevski) A choice function f is coherent
iff there is a finite set of binary relations >i on X such that, for any A ⊆ X,
f(A) is the set of all elements of A that are maximal in A for at least one of
the >i’s.
C Beyond the assignment game
We shall present here two examples. Our first example follows the hint given
in Theorem 7 and shows, in an assignment game, a core element that is an
unstable agreement.
Example 1 There are two sellers Si and two buyers Bj for i, j = 1, 2. Both
sellers have a reservation price of 5 and each buyer has a value of 10 for each
of the two houses.
The choice function fi of seller i, if presented with contracts with both buyers
for the same price will choose the contract with buyer j = i. Similarly the choice
function fj of seller j, if presented with contracts for both houses at the same
price will choose the contract with seller i = j.
The set A of contracts that includes a contract x for the sale of house 1 to
buyer 2 and a contract y for the sale of house 2 to buyer 1 both for a price p,
5 ≤ p ≤ 10 is easily seen to be in the core, in fact it is a competitive equilibrium.
But if z is a contract for the sale of house 1 to buyer 1 for price p defined above,
then, by the definition of the choice function we have fS1({x} ∪ {z}) = {z} and
fB1({y} ∪ {z}) = {z}, and therefore z ∈ fS(A ∪ {z}) ∩ fB(A ∪ {z}) and A is an
unstable agreement.
Our second example requires the simplest generalization of the assignment
game: sellers each have two houses to sell, buyers are interested in buying only
one house. Suppose a single seller with two houses and two buyers. Seller S
has two houses a and b that he is considering selling. His (or hers) preferences
are defined by three reserve prices: ca for house a, cb for house b and cab for
selling both houses. If cab = ca + cb the seller essentially sells his two houses
independently. If cab > ca + cb, the two houses are substitutes: S is ready to
let go of one house, any one of the two, but will keep the other one, unless a
very generous offer is made for the second one. If cab < ca + cb, the two houses
are complements: S is ready to let go of both houses together, but will resist
selling only one of them, unless a very generous offer is made for just one of the
houses. The choice function fS of the seller chooses the most profitable of four
possibilities:
• not selling any house, for a gain of 0,
• selling only house a at price p for a profit of p− ca,
• selling only house b at price p for a profit of p− cb, or
• selling both houses to different buyers at pa and pb respectively for a profit
of pa + pb − cab.
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Note that S never chooses a set that contains two contracts with the same buyer.
Note that, if cab ≥ ca + cb the choice function that characterizes S’s preferences
is coherent, but if cab < ca + cb, it is not. Buyers B1 and B2 value the two
houses at ha,j and hb,j for j = 1, 2 respectively.
Our last example shows that stable agreements need not be in the core.
Example 2 Let ca = cb = 5, cab = 9, ha,1 = hb,2 = 8 and ha,2 = hb,1 = 7. The
solution A = 〈x, y〉 where xI = yI = S, xJ = B1, yJ = B2, xT = b, yT = a,
xP = yP = 6 and x and y are both the preferred contracts with those proper-
ties is a stable agreement that is not Pareto-optimal, therefore not in the core.
It is clear that the solution A is not Pareto-optimal: it would be better for
everyone to sell a to B1 and b to B2. Let us show that A is a stable agreement.
Since, in A, S gains 2 and would gain only 1 by selling only one of the houses
and gain 0 by not selling, fS(A) = A. Also both buyers prefer to trade for a
gain of 1 to not trading and therefore A is an agreement. Let us now consider
adding a contract z to A. If z is a sale of b to B1, it will be rejected by S if
zP < 6 and by B1 if zP > 6. If zP = 6 it is less preferred than x by construction
for both S and B1. Similarly if z is a sale of a to B2. Let now z be a sale of a
to B1. For S to accept z requires abandoning the sale of a to B2 since S cannot
sell the same house twice, and abandoning also the sale of b to B1 since S never
proposes to sell both houses to the same buyer. Therefore it is only for a price
p such that p− ca ≥ 12− cab = 3, i.e., p ≥ 9 that S would not reject z. But if
p > 8, B1 will reject z. The proof for the case z is a sale of b to B2 is similar.
We have shown that A is a stable agreement.
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